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Abstract
Despite growing interest regarding the distributive impact of macroeconomic poli-
cies, the relationship between monetary policy and inequality has received relatively
little attention in the literature. This is partly explained by the fact that the workhorse
model used for monetary policy analysis summarises the demand-side of the economy
by means of a representative agent, whose welfare is the normative criterion of opti-
mal policy. However, alternative formulations using incomplete market models which
feature heterogeneous agents, indicate that monetary policy does have an effect on the
distribution of income, consumption and wealth, which potentially has implications
for the design and conduct of optimal policy. The document empirically investigates
the nature of the relationship between monetary policy and household’s labour income
inequality in Mexico. The results indicate that inequality of aggregate household’s
labour–income increases as a result of an unanticipated increase in nominal interest
rate. However, the result is differentiated across labour markets, as well as across the
distribution of income, with inequality declining among households in the bottom half
of the distribution, whose head is employed in the informal labour market. The find-
ings are robust to the particular measure of inequality used, as well as the procedure
used to identify the policy shocks.
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1 Introduction
Although the study of the distributional consequences of certain macroeconomic policies,
such as fiscal policy, is an integral part of their analysis and formulation; the distributional
consequences of monetary policy have received relatively little attention in the literature.
This partly reflects the fact that current practice favours the use of representative–agent
models for its study. Thus, while welfare considerations are the normative criterion for the
evaluation of monetary policy, the utilisation of a single representative agent precludes the
analysis of the distributional consequences of policy.
The assumption of a representative agent is equivalent to the assumption that markets
are complete. However, empirical evidence suggests that agents have differentiated access
to certain key markets, such as the ones for employment and financial services, which result
in substantial heterogeneity in the capacities of households to insure against idiosyncratic
shocks, such as spells of unemployment Blundell et al. (2008).
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013) and Guvenen (2011) review recent attempts to introduce
heterogeneous households into monetary policy models. The surveyed evidence suggests that
heterogeneity is affected by monetary policy. Moreover, the transmission of monetary policy
is also affected by the particular nature and magnitude of heterogeneity that characterises
the model economy under study. Of particular interest to the design and implementation of
policy, is that the rules that are optimal under the representative agent framework are no
longer optimal under household heterogeneity.
The purpose of this paper is to identify empirical regularities regarding the impact of
monetary policy shocks on the inequality of households in Mexico, which could eventually
serve as reference in the development of models for monetary policy analysis and formulation
for developing countries. In an ideal setting the focus would be on the effect of policy on
inequality across the across the household’s budget constraint, beginning with the effect on
hours worked and finalising with the effect on household’s wealth. Of particular interest is
the effect on consumption. However, not all the relevant data is available for the Mexican
case, such as data on wealth; and some of it is only available sporadically, as is the case for
data on consumption which is published on a biennial basis. Thus, the focus is placed on
the effects of monetary policy on labour income.
In general terms, the paper follows the approach used by Coibion et al. (2012) to analyse
the impact of monetary policy shocks on inequality in the United States. That is monetary
policy shocks are identified using a structural model, and inequality is measured from house-
hold survey data. Then the effect of shocks on inequality is evaluated using a time–series
model.
The findings of the model indicate that unanticipated increases in the nominal interest
rate rise overall household’s labour income inequality. The result reflects the dynamics of
labour income of households in the top half of the distribution whose heads work in the
formal sector. In contrast, labour income inequality decreases in response to contractionary
monetary policy shocks among households located in the bottom half or the income distribu-
tion, whose heads work in the informal sector. However, it must be stressed that the reduced
inequality reflects lower income levels, so it is by no means a socially desirable outcome.
While the findings are broadly in line with results found by Coibion et al. (2012) and
Gornemann et al. (2015), the specific responses of wages and income between the formal
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and informal sector, are at odds with the mechanics of the income composition channel. A
possible explanation could be that, as documented by Campos-Vazquez (2010), as a result of
adverse macroeconomic shocks young and unskilled workers are the most likely to be forced
to migrate from the formal to informal sector. Since this group of workers has benefited
the most from the fall in the returns to skill over the last two decades, their migration from
the formal to the informal sector could account for the rise (fall) in inequality in the formal
(informal) sector.
The paper’s contributions are threefold. Empirically, to the best of my knowledge the
paper is the first to explore the effects of monetary policy on labour income inequality for
the case of Mexico, highlighting the heterogeneous effect between households whose heads
work in the formal or informal labour market. Second, from a methodological perspective
the paper demonstrates that in order to account for informality it is not sufficient to measure
an overall formality premium, through the use of indicator variables. Instead the evidence
indicates, that the returns of other observable characteristics, such as age and schooling,
are statistically different between the formal and informal labour markets. Third, the paper
documents the evolution of cross-sectional facts of labour income in Mexico, accounting for
observable characteristics, thus updating the work of Binelli and Attanasio (2010).
The rest of the document is organised as follows. Section 2 analyses the evolution of
labour income inequality in Mexico over the period 1995–2014. Next, section 3 details
the benchmark shock–identification procedure, while the results are discussed in section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The evolution of labour–income inequality
Although inequality remains one its distinctive features, in contrast to the rising trend ob-
served in the developed world (Krueger et al., 2010), inequality in Latin America has fallen
significantly since the late 1990s (Lo´pez-Calva and Lustig, 2010; Ferreira and Ravallion,
2009). Notwithstanding the recent decline, inequality remains elevated across Latin Amer-
ica.
In the case of Mexico, income inequality has exhibited a declining trend that began in
1994 and continues to date, although at a substantial lower rate since 2011. The findings of
Esquivel et al. (2010) indicate that over half of the observed reduction of income inequal-
ity can be explained by the reduction of inequality of labour income. In particular, after
decomposing the reduction of labour income inequality into changes in the observable char-
acteristics of the workforce, and changes in the returns to these characteristics, Campos et al.
(2014) concludes that although changes in characteristics increased inequality of income, the
dynamics of their returns compensated their effect and explain the dynamics of inequality
reduction. In view of this and considering the availability of data, the paper focuses on the
impact of monetary policy shocks on the distribution of household labour income in Mexico.
To put the importance of labour-income in context, table 1 summarises the main sources
of household income by decile from the most recently available survey data. On average two
thirds of household’s income stems form labour earnings, although its relative importance is
very heterogeneous across the distribution ranging from 38.5% in the first decile to 69,8% in
the ninth decile. Within labour income, the composition between salaried work and indepen-
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dent work earnings is also heterogeneous with independent work earnings above the mean
for deciles I through V. This is relevant because as discussed by Porta and Shleifer (2014) the
vast majority of independent workers work in the informal sector, which is characterised by
very low productivity levels and has little, if any, access to social security and formal finan-
cial services. As expected, transfers represent an important proportion of current income for
the poorest households, with that proportion reaching 36.4% in the first decile. However it
should be noted that even for households in the top decile, transfers still account for 15.3%
of income. Finally, in contrast to the relevance of capital income, which increases mono-
tonically with income levels, the proportion represented by imputed rent income declines as
income increases.
Before summarising the main features of the recent evolution of inequality, the next
subsection briefly describes the data sources as well as the procedures used to obtain the
labour–income measures which will be used throughout the paper.
2.1 Data
Considering the time frame in which monetary policy shocks propagate through the econ-
omy, it is necessary to use data at sub-annual frequencies. With this in mind, inequality
is measured using labour income drawn from the Mexican Labour Force Survey, which is
available on a quarterly basis.
The data set contains observations from the first quarter of 1995 through the third quarter
of 20141. The start date was chosen to coincide with the adoption of a flexible exchange
regime by the monetary authorities in Mexico. In addition, it roughly corresponds to the
beginning of the period of declining inequality.
The observations from the period 1995.I through 2004.IV are drawn from the National
Urban Employment Survey (ENEU) (INEGI, 2001), while the data corresponding to the
period 2005.I through 2014.III, come from the National Survey of Labour and Employment
(ENOE) (INEGI, 2007). Since the ENEU survey is only representative at the urban level,
in order to splice the data from both surveys, observations from the ENOE survey are re-
stricted to those corresponding to urban areas which were persistently surveyed over the
period 1995-20142: Mexico City, Guadalajara, Monterrey, Puebla, Leo´n, San Luis Potos´ı,
Me´rida, Chihuahua, Tampico, Veracruz, Acapulco, Aguascalientes, Morelia, Toluca, Saltillo,
Villahermosa, Tijuana, Culiaca´n, Hermosillo, Durango, Tepic, Campeche, Cuernavaca, Oax-
aca, Zacatecas, Colima, Quere´taro and Tlaxcala.
At the individual level, labour income is computed for workers aged 25-65 who are regular
residents of the household surveyed, that worked a positive number of hours during the week
previous to the survey, and that do not report working on the street in exchange for tips,
as the activity is not considered employment for official figures. In order to reduce the bias
introduced by extreme observations, the sample is further restricted to those individuals
which report real hourly wages of less than 2,000 pesos.
1Although survey data is available through the fourth quarter of 2015, only data up to the third quarter
of 2014 was used because as a result of the constitutional reform that increased the minimum working age
from 14 to 15 years of age, the most recent survey waves are not directly comparable to those corresponding
to quarters before 2004.IV
2The splicing algorithm is partially based on the procedure used by Alcaraz and Nakashima (2013)
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At the household level, labour–income includes income by all household members who
are older than 14 years of age. However, for the computation of summary statistics only
households whose head is aged between 25 and 65 are considered. Equivalised household
income is calculated by adjusting each household member’s labour income by a factor of 1
for the household head and 0.5 for individuals of at least 14 years of age.
Individual hourly wages are obtained by dividing the reported monthly income over the
product of reported weekly hours worked times a factor of 4.33. All nominal income measures
are deflated using the consumer price index with base corresponding to the second fortnight
of December 2010.
Unless otherwise noted, all summary measures are computed using survey sampling
weights. In the case of hourly wages, the weights used are the product of sampling weights
times weekly hours worked.
2.2 Labour–income dynamics
Figure 1 summarises the evolution of median hourly wages, total and equivalised income over
the period 1995.I through 2014.III. It can be seen that labour income dynamics largely reflect
fluctuations of hourly wages, which after a sharp decline in the aftermath of the 1994–1995
balance of payments crisis did not recover their pre-crisis levels until the early 2000’s. The
recovery in labour–income was interrupted by the onset of the global financial crisis of 2008–
2009, which caused another decline in households’ labour income which stretches to the end
of the study period. Reflecting higher wages, households whose head is formally employed,
as proxied by access to social security, consistently exhibit higher incomes than those in the
informal sector. While the formal–informal gap narrows, in absolute terms, when equivalised
income is considered, the gap has remained fairly constant across the study period.
Since the results for total and equivalised household income are very similar, for brevity
of exposition in the remainder of the document the analytical focus is placed on the evolu-
tion of hourly wages and equivalised income, which are comparable across individuals and
households, respectively.
Regarding the inequality of income, the evolution of the Gini coefficient is shown in figure
2, where the downward trend documented elsewhere is confirmed. It is interesting to note
that although inequality within the informal sector remains larger than in the formal sector,
its decline over time has been steeper. As discussed below this reflects the changing returns
to education. It is worthwhile noting that the relative stagnation of the decline in inequality
that can be observed towards the end of the period studies, originates in the informal sector.
In order to explore the dynamics of labour income across the distribution, figure 3 shows
the evolution of the ratio of the incomes of households in the ninth decile with respect
to those in the fifth decile, and the ratio of incomes of households in the fifth decile with
respect to those in the first decile. There, it can be seen that regardless of the labour market,
the aggregate reduction in inequality has occurred almost exclusively in the top half of the
distribution, with a larger reduction observed in the informal labour market. In contrast,
inequality within the bottom half of the distribution has remained broadly constant in the
formal sector and exhibits a creeping upward trend in the informal sector.
Although the changing nature of the features that characterise the labour force explain
a significant portion of the fluctuations observed in households’ income and its distribution,
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as documented by Binelli and Attanasio (2010) even after accounting for the changes in
characteristics and their respective returns a large part remains unexplained.
Under the assumption that at least over the short run, changes in worker’s characteristics
and their returns are independent of monetary policy shocks, the focus of the study is on
the evolution of inequality once the effect of observable characteristics have been taken
into account. Thus, unless noted otherwise, all subsequent references to household’s labour
income and their corresponding inequality measures, are based on residual measures.
Considering the findings of Ferna´ndez and Meza (2015) which indicate that informal
employment in Mexico is countercyclical, and inversely correlated to formal employment,
the sample is split into formal and informal sectors, where as before formality is proxied by
having access to social security.
For each sub–sample, in order to obtain residual measures of households’ income and its
dispersion, labour income measures (hourly wages and equivalised income) are regressed on a
square polynomial on age, which serves as a proxy for experience, a dichotomic variable that
indicates whether the individual finished middle–school, which is a broad proxy for ability, as
well as a set of dichotomic variables that account for the marital status of the individual, the
heterogeneity of the urban area where the households are located, as well as of the industry
where individuals work in. In the case of households, the regressors correspond to those of
the household head. To account for the bias that results from self-selection of women into
the labour force, instead of including a dichotomic variable to identify the individual’s sex,
the residuals for women were estimated separately using the selection model proposed by
Heckman (1976).
Figure 4 illustrates the evolution of the coefficients on age and schooling in the determi-
nation of the income measures used, where the confidence intervals were constructed from
robust standard errors estimated by clustering at individual industry-city pairs3.
Overall, results indicate that the returns of experience on wages and household income
have remained roughly constant over time, with the exception of the returns on men’s wages
which show a downward trend. It is interesting to note that whereas the returns on experience
are not statistically different between the formal and informal sectors for wages of men and
women, as well as equivalised income of households headed by men, the returns to experience
on female–headed household income in the formal sector are negative, perhaps reflecting
discrimination in the workplace.
For their part, returns to skill exhibit a clear downward trend for both sexes, with the
decline being more pronounced for women. As documented by Campos et al. (2014), this
has been the main determinant of the observed reduction of inequality of income in Mexico
over the last two decades. The fact that the returns to skills have been more pronounced for
informal workers explains the magnitude of the decline in inequality within this segment of
the labour market.
It is important to note that the differences in the evolution of coefficients across labour
markets indicate that only including an indicator variable to account for the effect of infor-
mality would bias the estimated coefficients as well as the residual inequality measures.
Panel (a) in figure 5 shows the evolution of median residual labour–income and the
3To avoid cluttering the graph only the linear coefficient on age is shown, the quadratic coefficient is
negative as expected, indicating declining marginal returns to experience.
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resulting Gini coefficient. The first feature to note is that the clear association between
labour income and the business cycle, which was evident in the unconditional data, dissipates
to a large extent. Second, the residual income measures are markedly more volatile, more so
for the case of formal labour market income, perhaps pointing to the changing composition
of the labour force within the formal sector across the business cycle. Third, the dynamics of
aggregate residual median income closely track the evolution of labour income originating in
the informal sector, underlining its magnitude. Finally, the gap between formal and informal
income widens with respect to unconditional data and becomes more volatile.
Regarding inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, panel (b) in figure 5 shows that
once observable characteristics are accounted for the downward trend in aggregate inequality
and within the formal market ceases to exist. While the downward trend still characterises
inequality within the informal sector, its slope is much flatter than with unconditional data.
This is a novel finding, since the downward trend is preserved when informality is accounted
for by using a dichotomic variable instead of estimating the coefficients separately for the
formal and informal labour market4. This underlines the importance of recognising that the
differences between the formal and informal labour markets go well beyond a shift in the level
of income. The previous point lies behind the fact that aggregate inequality is larger than
the inequality within either labour market, implying that the differences between income
levels between markets is larger than the differences found within them.
As was the case with unconditional data, in panel (c) of figure 6 it can be seen that
the dynamics of aggregate inequality largely reflect the fluctuations in the top half of the
distribution. Moreover, in contrast to the evolution of residual inequality within the formal
sector, which has remained roughly constant over the study period, labour income inequality
within the informal sector is characterised by a clear downward trend. It is interesting to
note that among households whose heads work in the informal sector, towards the end of
the period the inequality of income in the top half of the distribution is smaller than in the
bottom half of the distribution, where the inequality of equivalised income has not kept the
pace of reduction of wage income.
Having captured the main features of the evolution of inequality from the mid 1990s
through 2014, the next section describes the identification of monetary policy shocks used
for the analysis.
3 Identification of monetary policy shocks
Under an inflation targeting regime, such as the one used to conduct monetary policy in
Mexico (Banco de Me´xico, 2007), the policy instrument is a short-term interest rate, which
in the case of Mexico is the overnight interbank lending rate.
Under the assumption that economic agents are forward–looking, agents will form ex-
pectations regarding the evolution of the policy rate. This means that, even in the presence
of nominal frictions, if a rate change is fully anticipated the effect of the actual change on
economic aggregates will be negligible. However, if the actual change is different from ex-
pectations, depending on the sign and magnitude of the discrepancy, as well as of the nature
4See, for example, figure 3 in a previous version of this paper (Villarreal, 2014).
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of nominal frictions, monetary policy can have significant effects on the economy at large
(Gal´ı, 2008).
Thus, for the analysis of monetary policy the interest lies not on the observed changes
in the policy rate, but on its unanticipated fluctuations, which are commonly referred to as
monetary policy shocks. In order to identify monetary policy shocks it is necessary to impose
some economic structure on the data. To do so, a standard small open economy dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model is used.
3.1 Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model
The basic model specification is that proposed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), which in
turn is a simplification of the small open economy extension of the standard New Keynesian
DSGE posed by Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005). The model is characterised by a representative
agent which forms expectations rationally, a continuum of monopolistic intermediate goods
producers which provide differentiated inputs to a representative competitive final goods
producer. Trade takes place in the context of a small open economy. A crucial assumption
of the model is that intermediate goods producers face restrictions on the frequency at which
they can adjust their prices.
The solution to the representative household’s optimisation problem yields the following
Euler equation, which characterises the equilibrium in the goods sector, and can be thought
of as a forward–looking open economy version of the traditional IS–curve:
yt = Etyt+1 − [γ + α(2− α)(1− γ)] (Rt − Etpit+1)− ρA∆At (1)
−α [γ + α(2− α)(1− γ)]Et∆qt+1 + α(2− α)1− γ
γ
Et∆y
∗
t+1
where the structural parameters are: γ which stands for the household’s intertemporal sub-
stitution elasticity, and α ∈ (0, 1) which denotes the import share in consumption, and
proxies for the level of trade openness. The endogenous variables are domestic aggregate
output yt, and the consumer price inflation rate pit. For their part, world output y
∗
t , the
first difference of the terms of trade ∆qt, and the non–stationary technology process At are
considered exogenous5.
Optimal price setting of monopolist producers, which face restrictions on the frequency
with which they can adjust prices, as in Calvo (1983), leads to the open economy version of
the Phillips curve:
pit = βEtpit+1 + αβEt∆qt+1 − α∆qt + κ
γ + α(2− α)(1− γ)(yt − yt) (2)
where yt ≡ −α(2 − α)(1 − γ)/γy∗t denotes the level of output that would be observed in
the absence of nominal frictions. In addition to γ and α, structural parameters include the
5As discussed by Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), since intermediate–goods firms have a degree of market
power, the evolution of international prices is not entirely exogenous. This means that, in strict terms, the
terms of trade are determined endogenously as the relative price that clears the international goods market.
However, according to Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) this imposes overly tight cross–equation restrictions
which yield implausible values for the rest of the structural parameters. In view of the above, the evolution
of the terms of trade are modeled as following the exogenously determined law of motion described below.
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discount factor β, and κ which determines the slope of the Phillips curve, and is a function
of the labour supply and demand elasticities as well as the degree of price-stickiness.
Under the assumption that relative purchasing–power parity holds, the consumer price
index can be defined as:
pit = ∆et + (1− α)∆qt + pi∗t (3)
where ∆et is the first difference of the nominal exchange rate, and pi
∗
t is world inflation.
The policy block of the model is summarised by a Taylor–type rule (Taylor, 1993) which
governs the evolution of the nominal interest rate Rt, allowing for the possibility that the
monetary authority responds to fluctuations in the exchange rate, in addition to changes in
inflation and output:
Rt = ρRRt−1 + (1− ρR)(ψpipit + ψtyt + ψe∆et) + εRt (4)
where, in principle, it is assumed that the policy parameters ψj for j ∈ {pi, y, e} are non-
negative. The term ρR is a smoothing term included to match the persistence commonly
observed in interest rates. The term εRt is an exogenous policy shock whose identification is,
for the purposes of this paper, the objective of the estimation of the model.
The model is closed by defining the laws of motion which determine the evolution of the
rest of the exogenous variables, which as in Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) are assumed to
follow AR(1) processes:
∆At = ρA∆At−1 + εAt
pi∗t = ρpi∗pi
∗
t−1 + ε
pi∗
t
y∗t = ρy∗y
∗
t−1 + ε
y∗
t
∆qt = ρq∆qt−1 + ε
q
t
where the εt’s are stochastic innovations which drive the respective processes.
3.1.1 Data
The identification of monetary policy shocks is carried out using quarterly data from 2001.I
to 2014.III. The start date corresponds to the adoption of an inflation targeting regime by
the Bank of Mexico (Werner and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002), which as documented by Chiquiar
et al. (2010) induced a significant change in the persistence of inflation in Mexico.
Data on the evolution of Mexican gross domestic product and consumer, export and
import prices come from INEGI. In the case of GDP, quarterly series expressed at 2003
constant peso prices are used. For consumer prices, the general monthly index, with base
equal to the second fortnight of December 2010 is used. The terms–of–trade index is built
from changes in the ratio of monthly export to import unit prices, which have base 1980. In
the case of interest rates the nominal quarterly average overnight interbank rate compiled
by Banco the Mexico is used. Data corresponding to quarterly GDP for the United States is
drawn from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, with base 2009; and monthly US inflation data
comes from the all–urban consumer price index series from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
All monthly series are averaged to obtain quarterly observations. Percent changes in
GDP, terms–of–trade and exchange rates were computed by multiplying quarter on quarter
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log changes times 100. In the case of consumer prices, the inflation rate is annualised by
multiplying log changes times 400. All series were seasonally adjusted using TRAMO–SEATS
(Go´mez and Maravall, 1994, 2001), and detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
3.1.2 Estimation
In order to identify the structural monetary policy shocks implied by the model, it is neces-
sary to estimate the vector of parameters θ = [ψpi, ψy, ψe, ρR, α, β, κ, γ, ρq, ρa, ρy∗ , ρpi∗ , σr, σq,
σa, σy∗ , σpi∗ ]
′, from the observables vector Yt = [pit, yt,∆et, Rt,∆qt]. To do so, a distribution is
defined for each of the parameters to be estimated. Based on this prior distribution, the data
is used to update the prior by means of the Kalman filter6. Following An and Schorfheide
(2007), the posterior distribution is then estimated by generating draws from the posterior
form obtained by applying Bayes’ theorem to the likelihood function.
Columns 2 through 5 of table 2 summarises the priors used for estimation. The bench-
mark prior takes into consideration estimations of small open economy models found in the
literature, however it should be noted that in general the parameter priors are fairly loose.
Based on the results found by Cermen˜o et al. (2012) for Mexico, the means of the policy–
rule parameters on inflation (ψpi) and output (ψy) are set to 1.5 and 0.75 respectively, while
the selected mean of the interest rate persistence parameter ρR is 0.80. In the absence of
relevant information for the Mexican case, the mean of the exchange rate policy parameter
(ψe) is centered at 0.25, while the mean of the substitution elasticity parameter (γ) is 0.5.
Both values correspond to the benchmark prior used by Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) for
Canada. Following Best (2013) the mean of the import share (α) is set to 0.5. In the same
fashion as Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) the intertemporal discount factor β is parametrised
in terms of the steady–state interest rate (rss). Based on the estimates of Ramos-Francia
and Torres (2008) its mean is chosen to be 2. Considering the same results, the mean
for the Phillips curve slope coefficient (κ) is tightly centered at 0.02. Following Lubik and
Schorfheide (2007) the parameters of exogenous processes are chosen by fitting AR(1) models
on the corresponding variables7. The priors for the standard deviation of shocks are non-
informative.
The parameter estimation results are listed in the last two columns of table 2. While a
detailed evaluation of the model is beyond the scope of this document, a few comments are
in order.
Regarding the policy–rule parameter, results confirm the Bank of Mexico’s adherence to
the so–called Taylor principle (Woodford, 2003), where optimal monetary policy prioritises
the response to deviations of inflation from its target, and the magnitude of the response is
more than proportional to the deviation observed.
Considering the importance of imported goods and services in the domestic consumption
basket, another result which merits attention is the relatively small value that is estimated
for the import share α. This could be related to the relatively high value of the point
estimate for the exchange rate parameter in the policy rule, which effectively dampens the
pass-through of fluctuations in the price of imported goods.
6The Kalman filter recursion is initialised using a diffuse prior as in Jong (1991)
7Considering the close relationship between the economies of Mexico and the United States, the latter’s
GDP and inflation are chosen as proxies for their world counterparts.
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Taking into account the very small value assigned to the prior of the Phillips curve
slope parameter κ, the estimated coefficient’s mean is smaller than the 0,3 found by Lubik
and Schorfheide (2007) for Canada8. While the difference is not statistically significant, as
discussed by Lee (2014), a smaller slope parameter could be evidence of significant financial
frictions in the Mexican economy.
The impulse responses of endogenous variables to a unit contractionary monetary policy
shock are shown in figure 7. In line with standard results found in the literature for small
open economies 9, unanticipated increases in the nominal exchange rate contemporaneously
reduce output growth, inflation and cause an appreciation of the nominal exchange rate.
While inflation and the exchange rate return to their original levels monotonically over a 10
quarter horizon, which is proportional to the response of the nominal interest rate, growth
of GDP quickly rebounds to positive territory and then declines monotonically.
The top panel of figure 8 plots the estimated monetary policy shocks across time. For
reference, the bottom panel shows the evolution of the overnight interbank lending rate, and
the annualised inflation rate over the same period.
With respect to the stance of monetary policy, it can be seen that from the middle of 2003
through the end of 2005, the Bank of Mexico embarked on a tightening cycle in response
to the breaches of the upper bound of targeted inflation of 4%. This resulted in a series of
positive monetary policy shocks. Once inflation returned to its targeted range, the stance of
monetary policy was broadly neutral until the onset of the financial crisis in late 2008, where
the reduction of the target for the policy rate resulted in strongly expansionary stance of
monetary policy until the beginning of 2010. In the most recent period, monetary policy has
remained broadly neutral with a slight contractionary bias, which could be in response to the
bouts of inflation volatility that have been experienced in the aftermath of the international
financial crisis, which reflect to some degree the evolution of the exchange rate.
In addition, from the figure it becomes clear that changes in the nominal policy rate
do not always correspond to the occurrence of monetary policy shocks. For example, note
that as a result of the flight to quality resulting from concerns about the sovereign debt
sustainability in the Euro zone, the depreciation of the Mexican peso caused an increase
of inflation starting from the third quarter of 2011. Despite this increase in inflation, the
central bank decided to keep its target rate on hold. This is interpreted by the model as the
negative, that is expansionary, monetary policy shock evident in the top panel of the figure
in late 2011. By the same token, considering the gradual reduction of the objective rate from
late 2012, the model interprets the non–response to inflation fluctuations experiences over
2013 as shocks.
Having identified monetary policy shocks, the next section explores their impact on the
evolution of household labour income inequality.
8Using the Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) benchmark prior, with Mexican data yields a posterior mean of
2,5 for parameter κ.
9See for example the results of Cushman and Zha (1997), Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005), and Lubik and
Schorfheide (2007).
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4 Impact of monetary policy shocks
As discussed by Coibion et al. (2012), from a theoretical perspective the effect of monetary
policy shocks on inequality is a priori ambiguous. Their empirical findings, based on U.S.
data, stress the importance of the so-called income composition channel, where monetary
policy has heterogeneous effects on different sources of income. The relevance of this channel
is corroborated by Gornemann et al. (2015) who, using a DSGE with heterogeneous agents
and incomplete markets calibrated to U.S. data, find preliminary evidence indicating that
as a result of falling output, the demand for labour as well as wages decrease, which cause
a fall in income of households which derive most of their income from wages. In contrast,
given the presence of sticky prices, the reduction in inflation lead to higher markups, which
in turn imply a greater flow of profits towards households who derive most of their income
from the ownership of assets. The result is higher inequality of wages and income.
While informative, the models of Coibion et al. (2012) and Gornemann et al. (2015) do not
consider the existence of an informal sector. Using a standard small open economy DSGE,
augmented to include formal and informal labour markets, Ferna´ndez and Meza (2015) find
that a reduction in output decreases both demand for labour and wages in the formal sector,
leading to a reallocation of resources towards the informal sector as a result of a greater
relative elasticity of labour supply in the formal labour market (Campos-Vazquez, 2010).
According to Binelli and Attanasio (2010), this should result in greater wage inequality to
the extent that wages in the informal sector are not constrained by labour market regulations.
Thus, for the case of Mexico, the evidence suggests that contractionary monetary policy
shocks should increase labour income inequality, and the increase in inequality should be
more acute among households whose heads are employed in the informal sector.
In order to investigate the impact of the monetary policy shocks on household inequality
in Mexico, the natural alternative is to first estimate a vector autoregresive model (VAR),
and then invert the coefficient matrix in order to compute the impulse response functions.
However, unless the true data generating process is well characterised by a VAR, the model
will be misspecified and the estimated responses biased. Considering this, the impulse re-
sponses are instead estimated using the local projection method proposed by Jorda` (2005),
which is robust to misspecification, and approaches the results obtained using a VAR when
it is the true data generating process.
Letting Yt denote the vector of variables of interest, in essence the idea behind obtaining
impulse responses using local projections is to estimate the linear projection of the s–step
ahead vector Yt+s onto the linear space generated by the information available at time t:
Yt+s = α
s +Bs+11 Yt−1 +B
s+1
2 Yt−2 + · · ·+Bs+1p Yt−p + ust+s (5)
where the objects of interest are the coefficient matrices Bs+1i for lag i and horizon t + s.
Defining the impulse responses as the difference between two forecasts at the same horizon,
Jorda` (2005) defines the impulse response from the local linear projection (5) as ÎR(t, s, d) =
Bˆs1d, where d is a column vector which defines the shock structure to be investigated.
At its simplest level household income will be affected by monetary policy shocks trough
their effects on the aggregate level of production, and on inflation. Thus in order to control
for a very general transmission channel, the impulse responses are computed including output
growth and inflation in vector Yt in equation 5.
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4.1 Response of median labour–income
Before discussing the relationship between monetary policy shocks and inequality it is illus-
trative to have a look at the relation between policy shocks and the level of the variables.
The cumulative responses, and the corresponding single standard deviation confidence in-
terval, are shown in figure 9. The results in the first row to the full sample, whereas those
on the second and third rows correspond to the results of the informal and formal labour
markets respectively.
For aggregate data, an unanticipated increase in the nominal interest rate causes a con-
temporaneous decline in hourly wages and income, which turns into an increase of income
after the sixth quarter, which is roughly in line to the impact on GDP growth stemming
from the DSGE model. However, the results are differentiated across labour markets. In
contrast to the response of hourly wages in the informal sector, which closely resemble the
response for aggregate data, wages in the formal sector decline over the short run and do
not experience a subsequent recovery until after 6 quarters. Despite the relative better per-
formance of wages, equivalised income within the informal sector declines on impact and
remains depressed over the course of about a year and a half. For its part, equivalised
income declines marginally on impact, and starts recovering after two years. The decline
of equivalised income in households whose head works in the informal sector, might reflect
negative externalities stemming from greater vulnerability within the informal sector.
The results are consistent with the notion that in the absence of unemployment insurance
mechanisms, the informal market tends to act as a buffer in times of crisis, absorbing workers
laid off in the formal sector. While this does not seem to have an effect on wages, it
depresses equivalised income since as shown in panel (a) of figure 5, median labour–income
is systematically lower in the informal sector. Moreover, results suggest the existence of
hysteresis in the informal labour market, evidenced by the fact that in contrast to households
whose head works in the informal sector, which do not experience a recovery in equivalised
income as economic conditions improve, households whose head works in the formal sector
do see an increase in their equivalised income as the effect of the shock dissipates over a two
year horizon.
4.2 Response of inequality
The response of the Gini coefficient of residual labour income to unanticipated nominal
interest rate increases is shown in figure 10. For the case of hourly wages, the response
of aggregate data is not statistically significant. However, looking at the results by labour
market, this result seems to be the consequence of opposite effects canceling out. While
wage inequality decreases marginally in the informal sector, it increases in the formal sector.
This response is consistent with recently unemployed workers, which according to Campos-
Vazquez (2010) tend to be mostly young and unskilled, migrating from the formal to the
informal labour market.
A similar differentiated response is found when looking at the response of inequality of
equivalised income, with inequality marginally decreasing among households whose head is
employed in the informal sector, and household income inequality increasing in the formal
sector, as a result of larger wage dispersion. In contrast to wages, however, in aggregate the
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effect does not cancel out, and an increase in household labour–income inequality is observed
for the full sample.
Figure 11 shows the response of decile ratios by labour market. From the top panel it is
clear that the aggregate results just discussed are to be determined by dynamics in the top
half of the distribution. In contrast, inequality in the bottom half for the distribution, for
both the full sample and the informal labour market, unequivocally decreases in response to
contractionary monetary policy shocks. The small magnitude and lack of significance in the
formal labour market are probably reflecting the relatively small number of workers from
the bottom half of the distribution who are employed in the formal sector.
4.3 Robustness of results
In order to assess the robustness of results, three alternative specifications are used. The first
uses the standard deviation of the logarithms of residual labour–income instead of the Gini
coefficient to measure inequality. The second classifies all own–account workers as informal
independently of whether they have access to social security. Finally, the third alternative
uses shocks identified by imposing different priors on the DSGE model discussed in section
3, as well as shocks identified by imposing sign–restrictions on a VAR model.
4.3.1 Alternative measure of inequality
As an alternative measure of inequality, the standard deviation of logarithms of residual
labour–income is used. As can be verified in figure 12, the use if this alternative measure
does not affect the results. On the contrary, for the case of the fall in inequality among the
informal sector as a result of the occurrence of a contractionary monetary policy shock, the
use of the standard deviation of logarithms strengthen both the magnitude and significance
of the results.
4.3.2 Alternative definition of informality
According to data from the latest available wave of the micro–enterprise survey (INEGI
and STPS, 2013), which is a biennial module of the labour survey, only about 45% of self–
reported own–account workers have access to social security. Thus the use of the alternative
definition can shed some light on the role of having access to social security. As argued by
Levy (2008), access to social security is a key dimension of informality, as it reflects the
impact of labour market regulation distortions which create incentives for the existence of a
large number of small and inefficient firms in the informal sector.
The results are shown in figure 13. Aggregate results are not robust to the definition
of informality, a result which seems to originate in the sample corresponding to the formal
labour market, where results using the alternative definition are smaller in magnitude, and
not statistically significant. While the results for the Gini coefficient and the 9/5 decile ratio
are roughly consistent with the benchmark case results, the finding that contractionary mon-
etary policy shocks reduce inequality among workers in the bottom half of the distribution
no longer holds.
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This discrepancy in results underlines the fact that having access to social security effec-
tively conditions the response of inequality to monetary policy shocks, perhaps because it
is correlated with access to specialised markets, such as the one for formal financial services
which might help households to insure against the occurrence of idiosyncratic risks.
4.3.3 Alternative shock identification strategies
Two sets of alternative shock identification procedures are used. The first follows the method-
ology described in section 3, however it uses the alternative prior distributions summarised
in table 3. The first alternative corresponds to the benchmark prior used by Lubik and
Schorfheide (2007) for Canada, and the second one uses the policy parameter priors pro-
posed by Best (2013) for the case of Mexico, where in contrast to the benchmark prior, the
prior for the exchange rate policy parameter is non–informative and does not constrain it to
have a positive value.
The main difference between the alternative estimations is explained by differences in the
slope of the Phillips curve. A flatter Phillips curve, such as that found under the benchmark
and alternative 2 specifications, implies that for a given inflation reduction the central bank
must tolerate a larger deviation of output from its potential level. This means that for
similarly sized shocks, the response of inflation is larger in magnitude and faster under the
alternative 1 prior. Moreover the relative contemporaneous fall in output is smaller and
its eventual rebound is faster when the Phillips curve is steeper. Finally, reflecting the
sluggishness of adjustment under the benchmark and alternative 2 priors, interest rates are
more persistent implying a longer period for exchange rates to return to their steady–state
level.
Despite the differences in magnitude and speed, the system variables respond in a quali-
tatively similar fashion to the benchmark case. Moreover, as shown in the first two rows of
figure 14, the response of inequality to shocks identified under alternative prior distributions
are almost indistinguishable from the benchmark specification10.
The parametrisation of the DSGE model imposes a number of cross–equation restrictions
which may not necessarily be supported by the data. With this in mind, the second set of
alternative shocks are identified by imposing restrictions on the impulse–response functions
of a VAR model. In particular, following the work of Carrillo and Elizondo (2015), the
following specification is used:
Zt = αZ +
p∑
i=1
DiZt−i + ηt (6)
Yt = αY +
p∑
i=1
AiYt−i +
p∑
i=1
BiZt−i + t
where Zt and Yt are, respectively, vectors of exogenous and endogenous variables, αZ and
αY are vectors of constants, Di, Ai and Bi are parameter matrices to be estimated, and the
10For brevity of exposition only the responses of equivalent income the full sample are shown. The results
for hourly wages, as well as those for the informal and formal labour market sub–samples are available from
the author upon request.
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vector of errors [ηtt]
′ is assumed to have mean zero, no serial correlation and covariance
matrix equal to:
Σ =
[
ση ση
ση σ
]
The variables used are:
Yt =

Output gap yt − yt
Inflation gap pit − pit
Producer inflation gap pipt − pit
Real exch. rate depreciation ∆qt
Real interest rate it − pit
Real money growth ∆mt − pit
, Zt =
US Output gap y∗t − y∗tUS Inflation pi∗t
Oil price inflation ∆wtit

where the domestic output gap yt−yt is obtained by computing the log difference of the level
of the series yt with respect to its Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filtered trend yt
11; core consumer
price inflation pit, producer price inflation pi
p
t , nominal interest rates it
12 and nominal money
growth ∆mt
13 are detrended using the HP filtered trend for core consumer price inflation1415.
All domestic data, are from the Mexican statistical institute, except for the real exchange rate
index which is from the Banco de Me´xico. US output and price data comes from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis, and oil price data comes from the Energy Information Agency16.
As discussed by Fry and Pagan (2011), from the several types of restrictions that can be
imposed on the impulse responses, in principle long–run (Blanchard and Quah, 1989) and sign
restrictions (Canova and Nicolo´, 2002; Faust, 1998; Uhlig, 2005) are the least restrictive17.
Considering this, in order to allow the data to “speak” as freely as possible, monetary
policy shocks are identified under alternative long–run and sign restrictions18.
In particular, two cases are considered. The first imposes (long–run) block exogeneity of
the exogenous variables and sign restrictions on the responses to aggregate supply, aggregate
demand and monetary policy shocks as summarised in the following matrix:

yt−yt pit−pit pipt−pit ∆qt it−pit ∆mt−pit
Aggregate supply +1 −1 −1 +1 × ×
Aggregate demand +1 +1 +1 −1 +1 ×
Monetary policy −1 −1 × −1 +1 −1

11Following standard practice, the Hodrick–Prescott filter is used with a smoothing parameter equal to
1,400.
12In contrast to the estimation of the DSGE model, where the overnight interest rate was used, the rate
for 28–day Mexican treasuries (CETES) is used instead.
13The M2 monetary aggregate is used.
14All changes are quarter on quarter changes.
15Price inflation and changes on the level of GDP and the M2 monetary aggregate are computed on the
basis of seasonally adjusted data.
16To price of West Texas Intermediate oil, which is the relevant commodity price for the case of Mexico,
is used.
17Alternative restrictions include recursive identification as in Sims (1980), and restriction on the contem-
poraneous effect of shocks on system variables as in Gal´ı (1992).
18A brief description of the methodology to identify shocks by imposing restrictions on the VAR impulse
responses is available in appendix A
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where ×’s imply no restriction. The second case imposes (long–run) block exogeneity plus
the sign–restrictions corresponding to aggregate supply and demand only.
As in section 4, the responses of inequality to the identified monetary policy shocks are
estimated by means of local linear projections. The responses of household’s equivalent
income for the full sample are shown in the bottom two rows of figure 14. Although the
results stemming from the VAR impulse response identification procedure are not as clear–
cut as those stemming from the benchmark specification, they are broadly in line with the
results discussed in section 4. That is, an unanticipated increase in nominal interest rates
causes an increase in inequality of household’s equivalent income. Moreover, the impact is
differentiated across the distribution as the rise in inequality concentrates on the top half
of the distribution; in contrast, among households in the bottom half inequality of labour–
income actually declines.
In summary, the response of households’ labour–income inequality to unanticipated
changes in interest rates are robust to both the particular measure of inequality that is
used, as well as to the procedure used to identify structural shocks. The results are however
not robust to the definition of informality, underlining the relevance of labour market in-
formality, which beyond excluding households from social security is correlated with limited
access to certain key markets, such as the one for financial services.
5 Conclusions
The macroeconomics workhorse model for the analysis and formulation of monetary policy
is the New–Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model, which relies on the
assumption that the demand–side of the economy can be modeled as a representative house-
hold, thus precluding the analysis of the distributive impact of monetary policy. The validity
of the assumption of a representative household hinges on the existence of complete markets
where households can insure themselves against the occurrence of idiosyncratic risks such
as illness or unemployment. The empirical evidence indicates that market incompleteness is
significant, thus casting doubt on the validity of the use of a representative household as a
modeling device.
Once households are allowed to be heterogenous, from a theoretical perspective the nature
of the impact of monetary policy shocks on household inequality, if any, is ambiguous since it
depends on the sign and magnitude of alternative transmission channels. Using data for the
United States, Coibion et al. (2012) and Gornemann et al. (2015) highlight the importance
of the income composition channel, and find evidence that household inequality increases as
a result of contractionary monetary policy shocks.
This paper follows the approach of Coibion et al. (2012) to empirically investigate the
impact of monetary policy on the distribution of household labour–income for the case
of Mexico. Recognising the relevance of the informal labour market, the paper separately
identifies the impact on households whose head is formally or informally employed, as proxied
by having access to social security. In line with the results found for the United States,
this paper finds evidence that unanticipated increases in the nominal interest rate cause an
increase in the inequality of household’s labour income. Moreover, it finds that the effect is
heterogeneous across households depending on whether their head is employed formally or
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informally. While over the medium term, households whose head is formally employed see a
increase in inequality of labour–income, this occurs in the context of rising real income levels.
In contrast, while the distribution of labour–income of households whose head is informally
employed becomes less unequal, this comes about as real incomes fall.
A possible explanation for the heterogeneous responses found among households stems
from the dynamics of employment across the cycle. In the absence of unemployment benefits
and very limited access to and use of formal financial services, which could enable households
to insure themselves against risks, the informal labour market acts as a buffer across the
business cycle, with young and unskilled workers the most likely to migrate from the formal
to the informal labour market as a result of shocks. Since this group has benefitted the
most from the fall of the skill premium in the labour market, which has been the main force
driving down the inequality of labour income over the last two decades, their migration from
the formal to the informal labour market can, in principle, explain the (rise) fall of inequality
of households whose head is employed (in)formally.
In terms of public policy, the results suggests that the impact of monetary policy on
households’ labour-income inequality could be attenuated by three sets of policies. The first
concerns the availability of unemployment insurance, which could afford workers to search
for employment within the formal sector, instead of migrating to the informal sector as a
response to unemployment. The second set is related to policies aimed at reducing the size of
both informal employment, which to a large extent reflect distortions introduced by labour
regulations Levy (2008), as well as the informal sector, which mainly reflect the incentives
created by the design and implementation of tax policies. The third set of policies are related
to a financial inclusion strategy which enhances the set of tools which households can use to
insure themselves against risk.
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6 Tables and figures
6.1 Tables
Table 1 – Mexico 2012: Household Income by Decile
(Current pesos)
Decile
Total I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
(Proportion of total)
Total current income 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Labour Income 66.43 38.49 50.03 57.40 62.60 65.85 66.36 68.99 73.11 69.75 66.32
Salaried workers 53.21 20.44 32.34 43.13 48.40 50.24 53.40 55.92 58.46 58.67 53.74
Own-account workers 10.46 13.58 13.33 10.41 10.75 11.69 9.14 10.35 11.88 8.57 10.54
Other labour income 2.76 4.47 4.36 3.85 3.44 3.93 3.82 2.72 2.77 2.51 2.03
Capital income 4.11 0.93 0.70 0.69 1.02 1.49 1.28 1.59 1.58 2.98 8.39
Transfers 17.25 36.40 31.14 26.10 21.62 18.32 18.92 16.18 13.17 16.16 15.25
Imputed rent 12.09 23.71 17.94 15.62 14.71 14.28 13.41 13.11 12.13 10.97 9.91
Other current income 0.12 0.47 0.20 0.19 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.14
Source: Author based on INEGI (2013)
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Table 2 – DSGE model parameters: Benchmark specification
Prior distribution Posterior estimation
Parameter Density Domain µ σ Mean 90% Interval
ψpi Gamma R+ 1.5000 0.7500 2.3730 [1.5039,3.2192]
ψy Gamma R+ 0.7500 0.3300 0.6253 [0.1904,1.0463]
ψe Gamma R+ 0.2500 0.1300 0.2663 [0.0864,0.4385]
ρR Beta [0,1) 0.8000 0.1000 0.8341 [0.7860,0.8839]
α Beta [0,1) 0.5000 0.2000 0.0090 [0.0005,0.0179]
rss Gamma R+ 2.0000 1.0000 2.0119 [0.4556,3.4739]
κ Gamma R+ 0.0200 0.0060 0.0236 [0.0136,0.0336]
γ Beta [0,1) 0.5000 0.2500 0.0244 [0.0118,0.0371]
ρq Beta [0,1) 0.1500 0.0800 0.1627 [0.0463,0.2751]
ρA Beta [0,1) 0.3500 0.1700 0.2327 [0.1906,0.2803]
ρy∗ Beta [0,1) 0.8000 0.1000 0.9048 [0.8561,0.9509]
ρpi∗ Beta [0,1) 0.5000 0.2500 0.2058 [0.0295,0.3660]
σR Inv. Gamma R+ 1.0000 4.0000 0.9724 [0.8026,1.1349]
σq Inv. Gamma R+ 1.0000 4.0000 3.6647 [3.1153,4.2348]
σA Inv. Gamma R+ 1.0000 4.0000 1.1732 [0.9608,1.3807]
σy∗ Inv. Gamma R+ 1.0000 4.0000 1.1444 [0.2399,2.7804]
σpi∗ Inv. Gamma R+ 1.0000 4.0000 2.9263 [2.4761,3.3725]
Notes: µ and σ respectively denote the means and standard deviations of the beta, gamma, normal
and uniform distributions; and the scale and shape parameters of the inverse gamma distribution.
The posterior distribution was estimated using Dynare version 4.4.3 (Adjemian et al., 2011) through
100,000 draws obtained using the Metropolis–Hastings algorithm, dropping 20% of the resulting
draws. The scale parameter of the jumping distribution’s covariance matrix was adjusted to ensure
that the acceptance ratio of the algorithm fell within the 25%-33% range.
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Table 3 – Alternative priors for DSGE model
Prior Distribution: Alternative 1 Prior Distribution: Alternative 2
Parameter Density Domain µ σ Density Domain µ σ
ψpi Gamma R+ 1.5000 0.5000 Normal R+ 1.5000 0.2500
ψy Gamma R+ 0.2500 0.1300 Normal R+ 0.7500 0.3300
ψe Gamma R+ 0.2500 0.1300 Gamma [-2,2] 0.0000 1.1500
ρR Beta [0,1) 0.5000 0.2000 Uniform [0,1) 0.8000 0.1000
α Beta [0,1) 0.2000 0.0500 Beta [0,1) 0.5000 0.2000
rss Gamma R+ 2.5000 1.0000 Gamma R+ 2.0000 1.0000
κ Gamma R+ 0.5000 0.2500 Gamma R+ 0.0200 0.0060
γ Beta [0,1) 0.5000 0.2500 Beta [0,1) 0.5000 0.2500
ρq Beta [0,1) 0.4000 0.2000 Beta [0,1) 0.1500 0.0800
ρA Beta [0,1) 0.2000 0.0500 Beta [0,1) 0.3500 0.1700
ρy∗ Beta [0,1) 0.9000 0.0500 Beta [0,1) 0.8000 0.1000
ρpi∗ Beta [0,1) 0.8000 0.1000 Beta [0,1) 0.5000 0.2500
σR Inv. Gamma R+ 0.5000 4.0000 Inv. Gamma R+ 1.0000 4.0000
σq Inv. Gamma R+ 1.5000 4.0000 Inv. Gamma R+ 1.0000 4.0000
σA Inv. Gamma R+ 1.0000 4.0000 Inv. Gamma R+ 1.0000 4.0000
σy∗ Inv. Gamma R+ 1.5000 4.0000 Inv. Gamma R+ 1.0000 4.0000
σpi∗ Inv. Gamma R+ 0.5500 4.0000 Inv. Gamma R+ 1.0000 4.0000
Notes: µ and σ respectively denote the means and standard deviations of the beta, gamma, normal and uniform distributions; and the
scale and shape parameters of the inverse gamma distribution.
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6.2 Figures
Figure 1 – Mexico 1995 – 2014: Evolution of labour-income for the median household
(2010 Pesos)
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Note: In order to improve the readability of the figure, the series shown were smoothed using a non–
parametric locally weighted regression with bandwidth equal to 0.15.
Figure 2 – Mexico 1995 – 2014: Evolution of Gini coefficient for labour–income
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Note: In order to improve the readability of the figure, the series shown were smoothed using a non–
parametric locally weighted regression with bandwidth equal to 0.15.
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Figure 3 – Mexico 1995 – 2012: Evolution of labour–income decile ratios
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(a) Informal sector
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(b) Formal sector
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(c) Full sample
Note: In order to improve the readability of the figure, the series shown were smoothed using a non–
parametric locally weighted regression with bandwidth equal to 0.15.
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Figure 4 – Regression coefficients
−0.10
−0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1 2015q1
Age
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1 2015q1
Middle−school
Informal Formal
(a) Women: Hourly wages
−0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1 2015q1
Age
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1 2015q1
Middle−school
Informal Formal
(b) Men: Hourly wages
−0.10
−0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1 2015q1
Age
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1 2015q1
Middle−school
Informal Formal
(c) Women: Equivalised income
−0.04
−0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1 2015q1
Age
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1 2015q1
Middle−school
Informal Formal
(d) Men: Equivalised income
Note: In order to improve the readability of the figure, the series shown were smoothed using a non–
parametric locally weighted regression with bandwidth equal to 0.15.
Figure 5 – Mexico 1995 – 2014: Evolution of residual labour-income and inequality
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(b) Gini coefficient
Note: In order to improve the readability of the figure, the series shown were smoothed using a non–
parametric locally weighted regression with bandwidth equal to 0.15.
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Figure 6 – Mexico 1995 – 2012: Evolution of residual labour–income decile ratios
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Note: In order to improve the readability of the figure, the series shown were smoothed using a non–
parametric locally weighted regression with bandwidth equal to 0.15.
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Figure 7 – Impulse Response Functions to a Monetary Policy Shock
(Benchmark DSGE model)
2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
GDP growth
2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
Inflation
2 4 6 8 10 12
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Interest rate
2 4 6 8 10 12
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
Exchange rate
Figure 8 – Smoothed Monetary Policy Shocks
(Benchmark DSGE model)
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Figure 9 – Impulse Response Functions of Median Income to a Monetary Policy Shock
(Benchmark DSGE model – by labour market))
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Note: The graphs show the cumulative response to monetary policy shocks. The responses were esti-
mated using local projections over a 12-quarter period. The solid line is the response’s point estimate,
and the shaded area its confidence interval.
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Figure 10 – Impulse Response Functions of Gini coefficient to a Monetary Policy Shock
(Benchmark DSGE model – by labour market)
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Note: The graphs show the cumulative response to monetary policy shocks. The responses were esti-
mated using local projections over a 12-quarter period. The solid line is the response’s point estimate,
and the shaded area its confidence interval.
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Figure 11 – Impulse response functions of labour–income decile ratios to a monetary policy
shock
(Benchmark DSGE model – by labour market)
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Note: The graphs show the cumulative response to monetary policy shocks. The responses were esti-
mated using local projections over a 12-quarter period. The solid line is the response’s point estimate,
and the shaded area its confidence interval.
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Figure 12 – Robustness of results with respect to the measure of inequality
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Note: The graphs show the cumulative response to monetary policy shocks. The responses were estimated using local projections over a 12-quarter
period. The solid line and shaded area are, respectively, the response and confidence interval under the benchmark specification, while the dot
and dashed and dashed lines are, respectively, the response and confidence interval under the alternative specification.
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Figure 13 – Robustness of results with respect to the definition of informality
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Note: The graphs show the cumulative response to monetary policy shocks. The responses were estimated using local projections over a 12-quarter
period. The solid line and shaded area are, respectively, the response and confidence interval under the benchmark specification, while the dot
and dashed and dashed lines are, respectively, the response and confidence interval under the alternative specification.
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Figure 14 – Robustness of results with respect to alternative shock identification schemes.
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Notes: The graphs show the cumulative response to monetary policy shocks. The responses were estimated using local projections over a 12-
quarter period. The solid line and shaded area are, respectively, the response and confidence interval under the benchmark specification, while
the dot and dashed and dashed lines are, respectively, the response and confidence interval under the alternative specification. DSGE 1 and
DSGE 2 denote the response of inequality measures with respect to shocks identified under the alternative prior distributions summarised in
table 3; whereas SVAR 1, and SVAR 2 correspond to responses to shocks identified from the VAR restriction schemes discussed in section 4.3.3.
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A Shock identification using restrictions on VAR im-
pulse response functions
To gain some insight into the procedure used to identify monetary policy shocks by imposing
restrictions on a VAR, let a reduced–form VAR model of order p be defined as follows:
Yt+1 = B(L)Yt + ut+1 (7)
where Y′t = [∆y, pi,R,∆e] is a vector of variables observed at time t, B(L) ≡ B1L+B2L2 +
· · ·+BpLp is a lag polynomial of order p, and the covariance matrix of the innovations ut is
given by Eutu
′
t = Σ.
The identification problem can be thought of as the search for a matrix Z which allows
the identification of the structural shocks εt such that ut = Zt, Eεtε
′
t = I, and ZZ
′ = Σ.
Typically there exists a multiplicity of Z matrices that represent de data, that is matrices
that satisfy ZZ ′ = Σ, thus it is necessary to impose restrictions to identify a particular Z.
Using the notation of Rubio-Ramı´rez et al. (2010), the matrix that summarises the long–
run impact of shocks on the system variables can be written as A+ = (I−B)−1A0, where I
is the identity matrix, and A0 = Z is the contemporaneous impact matrix. Restrictions can
be imposed on the impulse responses of system (7) by estimating its coefficients subject to
constrains of particular elements of the response matrices A0 and A+.
The estimation is carried out using the generalisation of the Rubio-Ramı´rez et al. (2010)
algorithm due to Binning (2013). The starting point for the algorithm is the estimation of
the innovation covariance matrix Σˆ from a reduced–form VAR, where the lag length of the
VAR is selected according to the Bayesian information criterion. The Choleski factorisation
of matrix Σˆ is then multiplied by an orthonormal random matrix in order to randomise the
impact matrix, and thus initialise the simulation procedure. The corresponding orthonormal
matrix is obtained by carrying out a QR-decomposition, using Householder transformations,
on a random matrix drawn from a multivariate standard normal.
Next, the algorithm searches for a ‘rotation’ matrix that satisfies the long–run restrictions
(See Rubio-Ramı´rez et al. (2010) for details). Once such a matrix is found, the impulse
responses to the shocks are computed and the sign restrictions are verified. A draw is kept
if all the restrictions are met, and discarded otherwise. The algorithm proceeds iteratively
until 1,000 successful draws are obtained.
Selection of a particular draw to recover the evolution of the structural shocks, is carried
out using the median target criterion proposed by Fry and Pagan (2005), which basically
solves a least squares minimisation problem to find the draw which is closest to the median
distribution across all the impulse responses in the system.
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